Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension between recommending customers more potential suppliers to match with and avoiding potential collisions. We introduce a stylized model to study the above trade-off. The platform offers each customer a menu of suppliers, and customers choose, simultaneously and independently, either a supplier from their menu or to remain unmatched. Suppliers then see the set of customers that have selected them, and choose to either match with one of these customers or to remain unmatched. A match occurs if a customer and a supplier choose each other (in sequence). Agents' choices are probabilistic, and proportional to public scores of agents in their menu and a score that is associated with remaining unmatched. The platform's problem is to construct menus for costumers to maximize the number of matches. This problem is shown to be strongly NP-hard via a reduction from 3-partition. We provide an efficient algorithm that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the expected number of matches.
Introduction
Platforms for two-sided markets enable agents from each side of the market to match with each other (Rochet and Tirole, 2003) . Such platforms are now ubiquitous, providing marketplaces for labor, dating, accommodation, and more (Horton, 2010; Fradkin, 2017; Hitsch et al., 2010) . A key feature of these markets is that a match between two agents occurs when both agents find each other acceptable. Therefore, in contrast to online commodity marketplaces, preferences of both sides must be accounted for in order to successfully reduce search frictions and form matches. Indeed, an important operational change in how Airbnb offers guest match recommendations was to account for host preferences. 1 Many of these online platforms, rather than determining who matches with whom, provide users with recommendations by presenting them with a set of potential agents to match with. Let us refer to the two sides of the market by customers and suppliers respectively. A natural question that these platforms then face is: which menus of potential suppliers should be shown to each of their customers in order to maximize the number of matches? Answering this question requires an understanding of the trade-off between making more choices available to customers and the ensuing congestion in the market. On the one hand, recommending a customer more suppliers increases the likelihood that the customer will find one of them more attractive than remaining unmatched. On the other hand, collisions may arise when multiple customers seek to match with the same supplier, thus potentially reducing the total number of matches (Halaburda et al., 2017) . This paper introduces a stylized sequential model to study the above trade-off. Each agent in our model has a public "attractiveness" score as well as an outside option score that are commonly known. An agent who is given a menu of potential partners chooses either a single partner from the menu, or, her outside option (i.e., to remain unmatched), probabilistically according to a distribution that is proportionate to the public scores of the potential partners in her menu and the score of her outside option. 2 While suppliers may have different public scores, we assume that the customers all have the same public score. The platform decides only which menu of suppliers to show to each customer. Only after customers exercise their choice, which is done simultaneously and independently, the menu shown to each supplier contains only the customers who have selected her. 3 A customer and a supplier match only if both choose each other. The platform's objective is to maximize the expected number of matches.
To gain further intuition, consider a marketplace with two customers and two suppliers, and assume that one supplier has a high public score and one has a low public score. One reasonable solution is to recommend each customer a different supplier and avoid the chance of a collision. However, if suppliers have high scores for their outside options, it may better to show customers both suppliers -even though this increases the chances of both customers selecting the same supplier, it also increases the chances of their selecting a supplier, and thereby remaining in the platform.
Our first result is to establish that the platform's optimization problem is NP-hard. Following this hardness result, our main contribution is the design of a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves a constant approximation ratio to the optimal number of expected matches. When suppliers have relatively low attractiveness scores, our algorithm buckets suppliers with similar public scores and uses this discretization to construct, for customers, menus that exhibit some overlaps. When suppliers have relatively large public scores, our algorithm constructs, for the customers, menus with no overlaps. The techniques that we use, and the complexities involved therein, are described in detail in Section 3, as are our main results.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and problem are formalized in Section 2. Section 3 states the main results and the techniques. Sections 4 and 5 provide the main steps of proofs for the two main cases (with some details delegated to the appendix). Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our findings and discuss a range of open questions.
Related literature
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. The first strand is the literature on assortment optimization in the context of revenue management of one-sided platforms. Following the seminal paper by van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) , which studies an assortment optimization problem for inventory selection using the multinomial-logit framework, there has been a vast body of work in this area models (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong et al. (2014) ; Méndez-Díaz et al. (2014) ; Bront et al. (2009) ; Gaur and Honhon (2006) ; Immorlica et al. (2018) and a survey by Kök et al. (2008) ). The key difference between these studies (which address a variety of choice models, dynamics, constraints, etc.), and our paper is that they consider one-sided markets in which the goal is to assign agents a menu of goods (who have no preferences) in order to maximize revenue. Moreover, these papers typically do not bound the number of goods of each type, but some papers consider models with a capacity constraint (Rusmevichientong et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2013) , which is inherent in our model.
Another stream of related papers consider assortment and congestion in two-sided matching markets. The benefit from limiting the assortment size in a two-sided market already appears in several studies (H. Halaburda and Yildirim, 2016; Arnosti et al., 2014; Kanoria and Saban, 2017) . Arnosti et al. (2014) analyzes the welfare effect of congestion in a large dynamic matching platform of jobs and workers under a mean field approximation model. They find that decreasing the number of applications increases the welfare on both sides. Our model accounts implicitly to the congestion in the market by maximizing the expected number of matches. Kanoria and Saban (2017) finds that restricting information and controlling which side can seek to match can increase welfare in a dynamic market. Our paper complements this line of work by considering a stylized static model while allowing for more heterogeneity of agents.
More generally, this paper is related to the two-sided matching mechanisms. Stable mechanisms typically typically elicits agents' ranking lists and form stable matches. In our problem a model of choice is estimated by the designer and (only first) choices are done in a decentralized manner. Our choice model, however, is similar to the a preference formation in several papers in this literature (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2014) .
Finally, we note the key difference between our problem and (online) stochastic bipartite matching (Feldman et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Manshadi et al., 2012; Haeupler et al., 2011) . In this literature the planner makes matches given some distribution over edges. In our model, the platform only offers a set and agents to choose from, which inherently creates collisions.
Model
The decision makers in our model are a platform, a set of customers, and a set of suppliers. Denote by M = {1, . . . , m} and N = {1, . . . , n} the sets of costumers and suppliers, respectively. The platform chooses a profile of menus {M i } i∈M , where M i ⊆ N is a set of suppliers that is shown to customer i ∈ M. We refer to the menu profile also as a menu set. Costumers, simultaneously and independently, choose at most one supplier from their menu according to a distribution that will be defined below. Then, each supplier observes all customers who chose her, and among those chooses at most one customer to match with according to a distribution that will be defined below; a customer that is chosen by a supplier yields a match. The platform chooses a menu profile to maximize the expected number of matches.
Next we describe how customers and suppliers make their choices.
Costumers. Given a menu profile {M i } i∈M , each customer i ∈ M simultaneously and independently choose at most one supplier from the her menu M i . Each supplier j ∈ N has a public score v j > 0. Moreover, every customer has an outside option denoted by 0, which is also assigned a score. We assume all outside options score are identical and normalized to v 0 = 1. Given that customer i is assigned menu M i , she chooses j ∈ M i ∪ {0} with probability
Hence, the probability that i selects a supplier from menu M i is given by
Suppliers. Once customers' choices are made, each supplier j ∈ N is presented with a set M j = {i ∈ M : j ∈ M i and i chose supplier j}. Given these menus, each supplier j ∈ N chooses i ∈ M j ∪ {0} where 0 denotes an outside option. Suppliers make choices in a similar manner to customers but we make two different assumptions. Every customer i ∈ M has the same public score normalized to q i = 1. Suppliers, however, can have different outside options. That is, every supplier j ∈ N has an outside option score q j ≥ 0. Suppose that supplier j is assigned menu M j = ∅, where M j is the set of costumers that chose j. The probability that j chooses any customer i ∈ M j is 1 |M j |+q j , and the probability that j chooses any customer is
. Note that if no customer chose supplier j, j must remain unmatched.
Remark. The choice models of suppliers and customers are consistent with Multinomial-Logit (MNL) discrete choice models. 4
Platform. We assume that the choice models of suppliers and customers (public and outside option scores) are known to the platform. The platform must select a menu profile to maximize the expected number of matches. Formally:
Definition 1 (Assortment problem for two-sided sequential matching markets). We are given a set of customers M and set of suppliers N with a set of public scores {v j } j∈N for suppliers (from the customers' point of view) and a set of outside option scores {q i } i∈M for customers (from the suppliers' point of view). Customers all have the same outside option score v 0 = 1 (towards suppliers) and all customers have the same public score (from the suppliers' point of view). The goal is to find a menu profile {M i } i∈M , which consists of a menu of suppliers for each customer, in order to maximize the number of expected matches.
Preliminaries. In Appendix A, we state some standard results that will be used in our proofs.
We use (a, b) R (and [a, b] R ) to denote the set of all real numbers r, such that a < r < b (and a ≤ r ≤ b). Also let (a, b) Z (and [a, b] Z ) denote the set of all integers i, such that a < i < b (a ≤ i ≤ b). Throughout the paper, we use boldface to refer to random variables. We also use boldface to refer to name the optimization problems presented later.
We say that a menu construction algorithm A has an approximation ratio α if the expected number of matches (M A ) achieved by the menu set returned by algorithm A is at least α times the optimal expected number of matches opt. Formally,
In our setting, we say that an algorithm is efficient if it runs in polynomial time in the number of suppliers and customers.
Main results
In this section, we state the main results of our paper. We first show that sequential assortment problem is NP-Hard. We state this result next but defer the proof 5 to Appendix B. Proposition 1. The sequential assortment problem is strongly NP-hard.
Our proof of the above proposition uses a reduction from the 3-partition problem, which is known to be strongly NP-complete (Garey and Johnson, 2002) .
Given the hardness result above, the main objective of this paper is to find an approximation algorithm with non-trivial approximation guarantees for the sequential assortment problem. We do so by finding a tractable balance between the analytical and combinatorial complexity of the problem. We provide an algorithm that has a constant approximation ratio and we formally state this result next.
Theorem 3.1 (General case). There exists an efficient algorithm for the sequential assortment problem that runs in polynomial time (in the number of suppliers and customers) and achieves a constant approximation ratio.
In order to prove the above result, we analyze the problem in two different regimes, each of which is interesting in its own right. The first regime is when all suppliers have scores v j < 1 and the other regime is when all suppliers have scores v j ≥ 1. For each of these regimes, we provide an efficient constant factor approximation algorithm for constructing the menu sets. Later we propose an algorithm that combines algorithms from both these regimes (in a black box fashion), which achieves a constant factor approximation to the general case.
The algorithms for both the special cases follow a similar strategy. First, we provide a different optimization problem that can be solved efficiently and is also an upper bound to our original objective. We then construct menu sets based on the solutions to these (easy to solve) optimization problems, that further achieve a constant factor approximation to the upper bounds and therefore a constant factor approximation to the original problem. Although, the algorithms for the two special cases follow similar strategy, the optimization problem that upper bounds the original objective and the menu set construction algorithms are completely different.
The first case (v j < 1) is the most technically challenging case. Next we state the result that gives an efficient constant factor approximation algorithm for this case.
Theorem 3.2 (Case 1). Suppose that v j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M such that the expected number of matches is at least a constant fraction α 1 of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set, where α 1 is some absolute constant.
To prove the above theorem, we first construct an LP relaxation of the problem (Section 4.2), one whose optimal solution upper bounds the expected number of matches obtained by an optimal menu set (Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3). Crucial to defining this LP is a two-dimensional bucketing (grouping) of the suppliers based on the values of their scores v j and of their outside options q j . We propose a rounding algorithm (Algorithm 1) that returns an integer solution and approximates the optimal solution of the above LP (Lemma 4.5) by a constant factor. We then use the output solution from the rounding algorithm as an input to Algorithm 2, which constructs the menus for the customers.
To establish Theorem 3.2, we show how the menus thus constructed using Algorithm 2 result in an expected number of matches that are within a certain constant factor α 1 of the LP relaxation upper bound and thus of the optimal menu set. We discuss the above techniques more formally in Section 4.
In the second regime all suppliers j ∈ N have scores v j ≥ 1. So in this regime a customer is at least as likely to choose any given supplier over her outside option.
Theorem 3.3 (Case 2). Suppose that v j ≥ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M, such that, the expected number of matches is at least a constant fraction α 2 of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set, where α 2 is some absolute constant.
For this case, we employ a slightly different approach as compared to the proof of Theorem 3.2. We first construct a combinatorial optimization problem (Lemma 5.1) that upper bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set. This combinatorial optimization problem can be solved approximately (up to factor of 1/2) in polynomial time (Lemma 5.2). We then construct menu set based on the optimal solution thus obtained, which can then be guaranteed to achieve a constant factor approximation of the optimal expected number of matches possible in this setting (Theorem 3.3). A detailed discussion of the proof of the above theorem is done in Section 5.
The results for the two different cases above can be combined to give a constant factor approximation to the original problem. The following result will be crucial for this purpose and the proof of which is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose there exist efficient algorithms that achieve an approximation ratio of α 1 and α 2 for cases 1 and 2 respectively; then there exists an efficient algorithm for constructing menus for customers i ∈ M and suppliers where supplier scores and outside options are v j , q j ∈ R ≥0 for all j ∈ N , such that, the expected number of matches is at least a fraction 1 2 min{α 1 , α 2 } of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set.
Note: Theorem 3.1 follows immediately by combining Theorems 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
4 Proof overview for the case where v j ≤ 1 for all suppliers j ∈ N
In this section, we analyze the case when all suppliers j ∈ N have scores v j ≤ 1. We provide an algorithm that outputs menu set {M i } i∈M , such that the expected number of matches under {M i } i∈M is a constant factor approximation to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set.
The organization of this section is follows. In Lemma 4.1, we show that without loss of generality up to constant factors we can assume all the suppliers have outside option score q j ≥ 1 and thereafter just focus on this special case. In Section 4.1 we introduce notations. In Section 4.2 we provide a linear program using the idea of bucketing that upper bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. This LP outputs a fractional solution; in Section 4.3 we use this fractional solution as an input to a rounding algorithm that outputs an integral solution and use this solution to construct a menu set that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. Next we state Lemma 4.1 and defer its proof to appendix.
Original setting: Let M and N be the set of customers and suppliers, respectively. For each supplier j ∈ N let v j ≤ 1 and q j be her score and outside option, respectively.
We define a new setting by modifying the outside option scores for a subset of suppliers. For the new setting let S def = {j ∈ N | q j < 1}. New setting: Consider an instance from the original setting, and define an instance for the new setting where, v j and q j , the score and outside option of supplier j ∈ N in the new setting are defined as follows:
We now state the following result which is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1. Given a menu set {M i } i∈M for customers, let M and M be the random variables counting the number of matches in the original and and new setting respectively. Then,
Remark: The previous lemma suggests that without loss of generality up to a constant factor, we can assume all the suppliers have scores q j ≥ 1. Hereafter, we focus on this case and assume q j ≥ 1 throughout the rest of this section.
Preliminaries
We now provide the notations useful for the purpose of our analysis. Let opt be the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set. We use the idea of bucketing, where we group different suppliers into buckets using a two
, and a representative value of the outside option q k 2 def = 2 k 2 . Note that for any j ∈ S k , w k 1 ≤ v j ≤ 2w k 1 and q k 2 ≤ q j ≤ 2q k 2 . Let B 1 and B 2 be the set of all w k 1 and q k 2 values, respectively, corresponding to non-empty buckets. Further, let the set of all non-empty bucket indices be denoted by B, that is,
In the rest of the paper, we slightly abuse notation and, when clear from the context, we refer to an optimization problem and to its optimal value using the same name.
LP relaxation
We now provide a linear program that upper bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set. the following variables will be useful for our analysis. For each customer i ∈ M and supplier j ∈ N , define a variable x i,j which takes value 1 if j is present in i's menu and 0 otherwise. Further, for every i ∈ M and k ∈ B define a variable x i,k , which counts the number of suppliers from bucket k present in i's menu. Note that
Consider a menu assignment x. The following random variables will be helpful. Let X k for all k = (k 1 , k 2 ) ∈ B be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose a supplier from bucket k. Similarly, let X k,j be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose supplier j from bucket k. Observe that
By linearity of expectation and the definition of ws, the expected value of X k satisfies
where we used that
For all k ∈ B, let Y k be the random variable counting the number of matches within market involving suppliers from bucket k. The expected value of Y k satisfies
The equality follows from the suppliers' choice model and value all customers who chose them equally at v i = 1, and the inequality follows since q j ≥ q k 2 for all j ∈ S k . We next provide an upper bound on the expected value of Y k that turns out be easier to work with for optimization purposes. Note that, for each j ∈ S k , the expression
, 1 . Further, by using Jensen's inequality we get E min
, 1 . Using the above two observations together with linearity of expectation and Equation (5), we obtain that
where the second inequality follows because min{.} is a concave function and the last inequality follows by Equation (4). Note that the variables x i,k are sufficient (and we don't need x i,j variables) to give an upper bound on the expected number of matches.
In what follows, we work towards a linear program relaxation for our overall problem. To do so, we first define the following optimization problem based on Equation (6) .
We show that the optimal value of the above optimization problem upper bounds the value of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. We summarize this result in the following lemma and defer proofs to Appendix C.1.
Lemma 4.2 (fopt upper bounds opt). opt ≤ 2fopt .
Next, we provide an LP formulation which approximates optimization problem (7) and therefore, up to constant factors, upper bounds the value of expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu.
Lemma 4.3 (lpopt approximates fopt). 
Rounding and menu characterization
Next we provide the rounding algorithm for the fractional solution returned by problem (8) . Later, using the solution returned by our rounding algorithm, we provide an algorithm to construct the menu for each customer. Finally, we argue that the expected number of matches within market for the constructed menu in the previous step obtains a constant approximation to the optimal menu. We now provide the description of our rounding algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1: Rounding
Input: The optimal solution to problem (8), x * . Output: A solution x that satisfies the properties in Lemma 4.5. Algorithm For all i ∈ M and k ∈ B, assign
Pick s k number of customers with minimum y i, values (breaking ties arbitrarily) in the set {i ∈ M : x * ik < 1}, assign x i,k = 1 and increment y i, = y i, + 1. end end
We next characterize some properties of the output of the rounding algorithm.
Lemma 4.5. Algorithm 1 returns an integral solution x that satisfies the following properties:
There exists a constant
The proof of Lemma 4.5 can be found in Appendix C.2. The first condition in the lemma implies that the rounded solution x has an objective value at least 1 2 lpopt and therefore, up to constant factors, is still an upper bound to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. The second condition gives a constant factor upper bound for the expression k ∈B w k 1 x i,k . This inequality is used later to construct a menu set such that the mass of the menu assigned to each customer i ∈ M (i.e., j∈M i v j ) of each customer is upper bounded by such constant. This will be crucial to achieve the constant factor approximation to our problem (See proof of Theorem 3.2). The third and the final property is useful in proving the guarantees achieved by the menu construction algorithm presented next (See proof of Lemma 4.6 for further details).
We now focus on constructing a menu set using the integral solution returned by the rounding algorithm. As mentioned above, although x i,k variables are sufficient to upper bound the value of the expected number of matches for the optimal menu set, we need the actual menu for each customer to determine the exact value. Next, we provide an algorithm to construct the menu for each customer and prove that the menu set constructed by our algorithm achieves a constant approximation to the optimal menu set.
ALGORITHM 2: Menu construction algorithm
Input: The assignment x returned by the rounding Algorithm 1. Output: A menu M i (x) for all i that it satisfies the properties in Lemma 4.6. Set c k,j = 0 for all buckets k and for all j ∈ S k . for k ∈ B do for i = 1 . . . m do Pick x i,k suppliers from bucket k with minimum c k,j values (breaking ties arbitrarily) and increment their c k,j values by 1. Also add these suppliers to menu M i (x). end end
In the above algorithm, for each j ∈ S k , the final value of c k,j is equal to the number of customers i that satisfy j ∈ M i (x). Since all customers are symmetric, we just need the c k,j values to calculate the expected number of matches. Our next lemma provides some crucial properties of the c k,j values returned by the Menu construction algorithm.
Lemma 4.6. The menu M i (x) for all i ∈ M returned by Algorithm 2 satisfies the following properties for each bucket k ∈ B 1.
The proof of Lemma 4.6 can be found in Appendix C.2. We use these properties to establish the following theorem, which is our main result for this section: Theorem 3.2 (Case 1). Suppose that v j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M such that the expected number of matches is at least a constant fraction α 1 of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set, where α 1 is some absolute constant.
Proof. Let x be the assignment returned by Algorithm 1, and let {M i (x)} i∈M be the menus generated by Algorithm 2. Given {M i (x)} i∈M , let X k be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose a supplier from bucket k, and let X k,j be the random variable counting the number of customer that choose supplier j in bucket k.
Given M i (x) for all i ∈ M, let Y k be the random variable counting the number of suppliers from buckets k that are matched. Also, let Y k,j be the random variable representing whether supplier j in bucket k is matched. Clearly, Y k = j∈S k Y k,j and by taking expectation on both sides, we have,
Now fix a bucket k ∈ B and a supplier j ∈ S k , the probability of j being picked given X k,j is:
where the last inequality follows since q j ≤ 2q k 2 .
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.5. We know that,
We can upper and lower bound the above expression as follows:
where we used
} 1 (as in Algorithm 2) and α i ≤ 2c for all i ∈ M (Equation (11)). For all buckets k ∈ B, we divide our analysis into two separate cases, depending on the type of supplier j ∈ S k .
Case 1: Supplier j ∈ S k satisfies w k 1 c k,j > 1. In this case,
The first inequality follows by Equation (12), and the second inequality follows by Chernoff bound. The third inequality follows by combining Equation (12) with w k 1 c k,j > 1, and the final inequality follows by Fact 3 in Appendix A. We can now calculate the expected value of Y k,j .
The first inequality follows from (10). For the second inequality, we consider only those a that satisfy a ≥ 1 2(2c+1) w k 1 c k,j , and for all such a we have
. In the final inequality we use Equation (13) to lower bound the probability term, and use the fact that c k,j ≤ 2 + q k 2 w k 1 (Lemma 4.6), which further implies that
Case 2: Supplier j ∈ S k satisfies w k 1 c k,j ≤ 1. In this case,
The second equality follows from the fact that, for all i such that j ∈ M i (x), the probability that i picks j ∈ S k is equal to
. Further, we have that
is greater than w k 1 /(2c + 1) because α i ≤ 2c (Equation (11)). Further, there are c k,j customers i such that j ∈ M i (x), which gives us the first inequality. The final inequality follows from Fact 2 and Fact 3 respectively in Appendix A. We can now bound E [Y k,j ] as follows
The first inequality follows from Equation (10) and the second inequality follows because a q k 2 +a ≥ 1 q k 2 +1 for all a ≥ 1. The final inequality follows from Equation (15). Now combining the two cases together for all buckets k ∈ B, we have,
for constant C = e−1 64e(2c+1) 2 . The inequality follows by combining Equations (16) and (14) together and the final equality follows from Lemma 4.6. Now, given M i (x) for all i ∈ M, let M be the random variable counting the number of matched suppliers. We have M = k∈B Y k , and taking expectation on both sides and further lower bounding this quantity we get,
and we have a c = C 2 approximation to the optimum menu via Lemma 4.3.
5 Proof overview for the case where v j ≥ 1 for all suppliers j ∈ N .
In this section, we focus on the case where all suppliers j ∈ N have scores v j ≥ 1 and provide an efficient algorithm that produces menu set which is a constant factor approximation to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. Similar to Section 4 we start by providing an upper bound to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. Our upper bound for this case is different from the one in the previous section, and it is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let m and n be the number of customers and suppliers, respectively. Suppose that v j ≥ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu (opt) is upper bounded by,
The proof of Lemma 5.1 can be found in Appendix D. One could use the optimal solution to the optimization problem in the lemma above to construct a menu set such that the expected number of matches achieved by this menu set is at least a constant factor approximation to this upper bound. Further, any approximate (up to multiplicative constant factors) solution to the optimization problem can also be used to construct a menu set with similar guarantees. With this motivation, the following lemma shows that there exists an efficient algorithm to solve the optimization problem (19) up to a multiplicative 1/2 approximation. Lemma 5.2. There exists an efficient algorithm that a integral vector y ∈ Z n ≥0 that satisfies n j=1 y j = m and
The proof can be found in Appendix D. In what follows, using the solution y returned by the algorithm previous lemma to construct a menus set that matches the upper bound in (19) up to a constant factor. We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Proof. Let y * be the 1 2 -approximate solution to the optimization problem in (19). Recall that, by Lemma 5.2 we can compute such a solution efficiently. Now,
Next, we show a construction of menus for customers that approximates this upper bound up to a constant factor.
Consider the following construction of menus M i for all i ∈ M. Set M i = {j} for some y * j number of customers. Since n j=1 y * j = m, this is a valid menu, i.e., we can find a non-overlapping partition of customers such that each partition is shown the same supplier j (and just j).
Now lets calculate the expected number of matches given these menus. Given menus {M i } i∈M , let X j for all j ∈ N be a random variable counting the number of customers matched to supplier j. Further, let Y j be the random variable denoting whether supplier j is matched or not. Then,
To lower bound the quantity P X j ≥ y * j /4 , first observe that
where in the inequality above we used the fact that v j ≥ 1 and there are y * j number of customers for which j ∈ M i .
An upper bound on the quantity P X j ≤ y * j /4 when y * j ≥ 1 can be obtained as follows:
For the first inequality, note that by Equation (22), we have that y * j ≤ 2E [X j ]. The second inequality follows from the standard Chernoff bound, and the third one from the fact that E [X j ] ≥ 1/2 (by Equation (22) combined with y * j ≥ 1). Combining Equations (23) and (21), we get
Therefore, the expected number of matches produced by our algorithm is lower bounded by,
for constant α 2 = 1/8(1 − exp (−1/24)). Hence, we have a constant factor approximation for this case.
Conclusion and open questions
Platforms for two-sided markets face the problem of providing their users with match recommendations. Taking an algorithmic approach to this challenge, this paper introduced a stylized two-stage model for assortment planning in two-sided matching markets. Agents in the model have public scores as well as an outside option score and agents' choices from given menus follow a distribution proportionate to the relevant scores. The key contribution is an algorithm that construct menus that are shown to customers that provides a constant approximation algorithm to the optimal expected number of matches. Several open questions follow directly from this work. The first question is to improve the upper bound and further provide a non-trivial lower bound. Second, is to address the case in which customers have different public scores. We believe that the same techniques will provide a constant approximation algorithm. Third, is to allow agents to have different types, thus having agents disagree over public scores. We believe that, as long as there is a constant fraction of each type of agents, there is an efficient algorithm that yields a constant approximation.
Other directions we find intriguing are the following. First, determine not only the menus but also which set of agents should choose first. 6 Second, allow a constant number of substitutions, thus allowing a "rejected" agent to choose another partner from her menu. 7 Finally, it is interesting to extend this work to more general choice models.
Preferences on both sides of the market add a new layer in comparison to the assortment planning problem in commodity markets. While the literature of the latter problem is mature, little is known about assortments in two-sided matching markets. 8 James Davis, Guillermo Gallego, and Huseyin Topaloglu. Assortment planning under the multino
A Useful Machinery for the Proofs
First we state some standard inequalities which we shall use throughout the proof section.
Fact 1 (Jensen's Inequality). If X is a random variable and f is any concave function then,
Fact 2. For any x ∈ R, the following holds: 1 − x ≤ e −x .
Fact 3. For any x ∈ [0, 1] R , the following holds: e −x ≤ 1 − e−1 e x. Fact 4 (Chernoff bound). Suppose X 1 , . . . , X n are independent random variables taking values in
We state and prove a technical lemma that lower bounds the expected number of distinct elements observed after n draws from a distribution close to uniform.
Lemma A.1 (Distinct elements lemma). Let p = (p 1 , . . . p n ) be a discrete distribution over n elements that satisfies p i ≤ c * p j for all i, j ∈ [1, n] Z and some fixed c > 1. Given m i.i.d samples from distribution p, the expected number of distinct elements observed is at least,
Proof. Without loss of generality assume p 1 ≤ p 2 · · · ≤ p n . Note that p n ≥ 1 n * c , else we know that p i ≤ c * p n < 1/n and i p i < 1, which is a contradiction. Hence p n ≥ 1 n * c which further implies p i ≥ 1 n * c for all i = 1 . . . n.
• m ≤ n. Let X i be a binary random variable that is 1 if the i th element appears at least once in the m samples. We know that the probability P (X i = 0) = (1 − p i ) m , and therefore E [X i ] = 1 − (1 − p i ) m . Now the expected number of distinct elements seen after m samples from distribution p is given by:
where the second last uses a standard inequality. 9
• m > n. Since the expected number of distinct elements seen after m samples is monotonically increasing in m, we can lower bound this case by assuming m = n. More formally, the expected number of distinct elements seen after m samples is
Combining the two cases above gives us the proof.
Lemma A.2 (Pomatto et al. (2018) ). Suppose X stochastically dominates X and Z is independent of X and X , then X + Z stochastically dominates X + Z
B Proofs omitted in Section 3
For the sake of completeness, we define the 3-partition formally below.
Definition 2 (3-partition problem). Given a set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m } of n = 3m positive integers, and another positive integer B, such that B 4 < a < B 2 for all a ∈ A, and such that a∈A = mB: can A be partitioned into m disjoint sets A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m such that a∈A i a = B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m?
Note the conditions in the above problem implies that each A i must contain exactly three elements from A. (2002)). The 3-partition problem is strongly NP-Complete.
Lemma B.1 (Garey and Johnson
We now reduce the above 3-partition problem into an instance of sequential assortment problem where the optimal menus for customers is the optimal solution for the partition problem.
Reduction 1. Our reduction works as follows:
• Let n be the number of suppliers, where supplier j ∈ [n] has score v j defined as follows:
Note that j v j = 1, and so we normalize these scores only for analytic convenience 10
• Let m = n 3 be the number of customers.
• Let v 0 be the outside option and it is the parameter we control so that the optimal menus is the solution for the 3-partition problem. Let the optimal menus be given by
, then we are already done. Assume, without loss of generality, that there exists a supplier h ∈ [n], that belongs to menus of both customer 1 and customer 2, i.e., h ∈ M 1 ∩ M 2 . Let M be the random variable denoting the number of matches under the optimal menus, i.e., M i 's.
We next calculate the probability that customers 1 and 2 both end up choosing supplier h. Below we use X 1,h , X 2,h to denote the indicator variables corresponding to whether customers 1, 2, respectively, choose supplier h.
Let α 1 def = j∈M 1 v j , and α 2 def = j∈M 2 v j , and note that α 1 , α 2 ≤ 1. Then,
10 See proof of proposition 1
Now, whenever customers 1 and 2 both choose supplier h, we must have a matching of size at most k − 1. Therefore,
Using the above observation to bound E [M ], we get
Consider the following disjoint menus M i for customers i ∈ [k]:
In other words, the i-th customer just observes i-th supplier, and since k ≤ n this is a valid assignment (and all menus are disjoint). We will show that there exists a v 0 for which these new disjoint menus ({M i } i∈m ), despite disregarding suppliers in the set [k +1, n], perform strictly better than the optimal menus {M i } i∈m defined earlier.
Let M be the expected size of the matching under menus {M i } i∈m . Then,
4k < 1, we have (using Equation (24) above)
And from Equation (25), we get
Finally,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma B.3. Menus {M i } i∈ [k] are said to be balanced iff
Whenever 1. the optimal menus are disjoint, and 2. it is feasible to construct balanced menus, the optimal menus {M i } i∈ [k] are balanced.
Proof. Let M be the expected size of the matching for the optimal menus {M i } i∈ [k] . Define α i def = j∈M i v j . Given that the optimal menus are disjoint, we have i∈ [k] 
The third equality follows because the function i∈ [k] x i 1+x i is concave in x, and the maximum under the constraint i∈ [k] x i ≤ 1 is achieved when x i = 1 k for all i ∈ [k], whenever possible. Proposition 1. The sequential assortment problem is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the sequential assortment problem is not strongly NP-hard. This implies that there exists an algorithm that solves the Sequential Assortment problem whose running time is polynomial in the size of the input. Now, given an instance of the 3-partition problem, we can reduce it to an instance of the Sequential Assortment problem as in Reduction 1 above. By way of Lemma B.2, as long as we define v 0 = It is easy to see, using Lemma B.3, that whenever an instance of the 3-partition problem has a feasible partition, the optimal menus of the corresponding instance of the Sequential Assortment problem are balanced.
Therefore, a weakly polynomial time algorithm for the Sequential Assortment problem is enough to solve the 3-partition problem in weakly polynomial time.
Proof. We define OP T (t, X) as the maximum possible expected number of matches in a market with t customers and a set X of suppliers. Let A be the set of suppliers with scores v j ≥ 1 and B be the set of suppliers with scores v j < 1. Hence we have A ∪ B = N and A ∩ B = Φ.
We first make a claim 11 that we will prove later.
11 For ease of exposition, assume m is even -the proof can be easily adapted if not From T heorem 3.2 and T heorem 3.3, we have algorithms A 1 and A 2 that achieve a constant approximation ratio of α 1 and α 2 respectively. Hence
. Combining these two observations along with the claim, we get the desired approximation ratio of 1 2 min{α 1 , α 2 } for OP T (m, A ∪ B).
We now proceed to prove the claim i.e. Equation (26). We define the optimal assignment S of the M customers to the set A ∪ B of suppliers, i.e., that which achieves an expected number of matches equal to OP T (M, A∪B), be one where customer i is shown the set of suppliers S i ⊆ A∪B. We define the modified assignment by S A such that S A i = S i ∩ A. For a given customer i and any supplier j ∈ A such that j ∈ A. Under the assignment S, the probability that i chooses j is given by
And under the assignment S A , the same probability is
For any j ∈ A, we then have
Let p j (l) and p A j (l) be the probability that l customers choose supplier j under S and S A respectively. As a consequence of Equation (27), we must have p j (l) ≤ p A j (l) for all possible values of l.
Let Y j (resp. Y A j ) be an indicator variable denoting whether j ∈ A gets matched or not under S (resp. S A ). We can then write
where X j (resp. X A j ) are random variables representing the number of customers that choose supplier j. These random variables can be written as
with X i,j (resp. X A i,j ) representing an indicator random variable denoting whether customer i chooses supplier j or not. From Equations (27) and (28), we can see that X A j stochastically dominates X j for suppliers j Wolfstetter (1999) .
We analogously define variable Y B j and have
Let OP T A and OP T B denote the expected number of matches limited to suppliers in A and B respectively in assignment . Clearly,
Combining Equations (30) to (32) we have,
We show next that
To prove the above, all we need to show is that OP T (t, X) ≤ Proof. Given the menu set {M i } i∈M for customers, let X j and X j for all j ∈ N be random variables counting the number of customers that match to supplier j in original and new setting, respectively. Similarly let Y j and Y j for all j ∈ N be random variables that denotes if supplier j is matched in the original and new setting respectively. Then, Lemma C.1. Let I be an instance of the problem with m customers and n suppliers, where v j ∈ R and q j ∈ R denote the score and outside option for supplier j ∈ N . Let I be the instance obtained from I by removing suppliers j with q j ≥ C. If opt and opt denote the expected size of the matching under the optimal menus for instances I and I respectively, then:
Proof. Let S and S be the set of all suppliers in instance I and I respectively. Let M i be the menu for the i'th customer in the optimal menu for instance I. Define M i def = M i ∩ S be the menu for i'th customer for instance I . Let Y j for j ∈ S and Y j for j ∈ S be random variables denoting if supplier j is matched under instance I and I respectively. Let M and M be the random variable denoting the number of suppliers matched under instances I and I respectively. Then M = j∈S Y j and M = j∈S Y j . For all i ∈ M, let X ij for all j ∈ S and X ij for all j ∈ S be the indicator random variable denoting if i picks j for instance I and I respectively. Define
. Since α i ≥ α i and X ij , X ij are indicator random variables, we have that X ij stochastically dominates X ij . Further since all X ij and X ij for all i ∈ M are independent random variables, we have that X j = i∈M X ij stochastically dominates X j = i∈M X ij (using Lemma A.2 inductively). This further implies E Y j ≥ E [Y j ], because Y j and Y j are monotone functions in X j and X j respectively. Further for each j ∈ S\S ,
, and
Using the above expression, we now provide an upper bound for the
For the final inequality, note that j∈S\S i X ij is always upper bounded by the number of customers m. Now we are ready to lower bound the value of opt ,
For the second inequality, we used the fact that
For the last inequality, we used Equation (35).
C.1 Proofs omitted in Section 4.2
For convenience, we restate optimization problem (7) where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use opt 1 to denote the problem itself and its optimum value:
Proof. Let M * (i) for all i ∈ M be the optimal menu for customer i. For each bucket k ∈ B, define x * i,k to be the number of suppliers present in menu M * (i) from bucket k. Here we aim to upper bound the expected number of matches achieved by optimal menu. Given M * (i) for all i ∈ M, let X k be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose a supplier in bucket k, then by Equation (4):
Now if we let Y k be the random variable counting the number of matches in bucket k for the optimal menu. Then the expected number of matches from bucket k is equal to E [Y k ], and by Equation (6) this quantity is upper bounded by:
Further note that 0 ≤ x * i,k ≤ |S k | and is a feasible solution to optimization problem (7) . The lemma statement then follows by summing over all buckets k.
In the remaining part of this section we provide the proof for Lemma 4.3 and we do this by providing a sequence of relaxations to problem (7) . In this direction consider the following optimization problem.
Lemma C.2. opt 1 ≤ fopt ≤ 2opt 1 .
Proof. The first inequality opt 1 ≤ fopt holds because the feasible set in problem (36) is subset that in problem (7), and they both share the same objective.
To show the other inequality, let x * be the optimal solution to optimization problem (7) and let
We now construct a feasible solution y for problem (36) as follows: For each i ∈ M,
If
Let
Therefore, y is a feasible solution for problem (36) and, further, for each i ∈ M consider each term in the objective,
The lemma statement follows because y approximates x * by 1/2 for each summation term in the objective.
Next we provide the second optimization problem that approximates optimization problem (36) and in the following lemma we provide the explicit approximation factor.
Lemma C.3 (opt 1 and opt 2 approximate each other). opt 1 ≤ opt 2 ≤ 2opt 1 .
Proof. The left hand side inequality opt 1 ≤ opt 2 is trivial. We now show the right hand side. Under the constraint k ∈B w k x i,k ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M, we have
The above inequality further implies that, for each k ∈ B
The proof follows by summing the above equation for all k ∈ B.
We now recall our LP formulation that upper bounds the expected number of matches in the optimal menu. Further, in our following lemma which show that optimum values of LP formulation and optimization problem (43) are equal. Now recall optimization problem (8) ,
Proof. Clearly, lpopt ≤ opt 2 . Next we show the other inequality. Let x * be the optimum solution for opt 2 . Now consider the following solution,
Since |S k | ≥ 1, it is not hard to see that y i,k ≤ x * i,k for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B. Further for each bucket k ∈ B,
Therefore y is the feasible solution of lpopt and its objective value is,
The second equality follows from equations (44) and (45). Therefore lpopt ≥ opt 2 . Hence the Lemma follows.
Lemma 4.3 (lpopt approximates fopt). i w k 1 x * i,k , |S k |}. Now summing over all buckets k ∈ B, we get:
The first inequality follows because 1 q k 2 i w k 1 x * i,k ≤ |S k | (a constraint in problem (8)). We next provide a proof for the second condition. Given an assignment x, we denote W = m i=1 {k∈B | x * i,k <1} w k 1 x i,k and for each l ∈ B 1 define W def = m i=1 {k∈B∈B | w k 1 = and x * i,k <1} x i,k and note that W = {k∈B and w k 1 = } s k . Furthermore, W = l∈B 1 l * W . We now provide an upper bound for W:
In the final expression, we exchanged the orders of summation. Further we used Observation 1 and also used the fact that for each customer i ∈ M, k∈B w k 1 x * i,k ≤ 1 (constraint of optimization problem 8). Now fix l ∈ B 1 , for each i ∈ M, we next give an upper bound for the quantity {k∈B | w k 1 = and x * i,k <1} w k 1 x i,k .
{k∈B | w k 1 = and x * i,k <1} w k 1 x i,k = * {k∈B | w k 1 = and x * i,k <1}
x i,k ≤ * W m + 1 .
The final inequality in the above expression follows from the assignment of the rounding algorithm. We are now ready to prove the second condition. For each customer i ∈ M, 
In the second equality, we rearranged the summation and used the fact that {k∈B: x * i,k ≥1} w k 1 x i,k = {k: x * i,k ≥1} w k 1 x * i,k ≤ {k: x * i,k ≥1} w k 1 x * i,k ≤ 1 (constraint of optimization problem 8). In the third equality, we used the fact that {k∈B: w k 1 = and x * i,k <1} x i,k = y i, for all ∈ B 1 and i ∈ M and this follows from the assignment of rounding algorithm. For the fourth inequality, note that y i, ≤ 1 + 
Combining Equations (52) and (53) x j x j + q j .
The second inequality holds because X * j is a non-negative integer valued random variable, and n j=1 X * j ≤ m with probability 1. Further the last inequality follows because the function n j=1
x j x j +q j is monotone in n j=1 x j .
Lemma 5.2. There exists an efficient algorithm that a integral vector y ∈ Z n ≥0 that satisfies n j=1 y j = m and n j=1 y j y j + q j ≥ 1 2 max {x∈Z n ≥0 :
n j=1 x j =m} n j=1
x j x j + q j .
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ . . . q n . Let x * be the optimum solution to optimization problem (19). Then it is easy to see that
Recall we wish to solve the optimization problem (19) approximately and it will be convenient to identify indices where x * i = 0. Using equation (55) we know that if x * i = 0 then x * j = 0 for all j ∈ [i, n] Z and it makes sense to define the following optimization problem. x j x j + q j .
Note the addition of constraint x j ≥ 1 in the above optimization problem. Using the definition of opt(i), the optimization problem (19) can be equivalently written as:
To solve the optimization problem (19) approximately (up to a factor of x j x j + q j .
Note all the constraints are linear and the objective is concave in x. Maximizing a concave function over convex set is a convex optimization problem and can be solved efficiently. Let x be the optimum solution for convex optimization problem (58). Consider the following integral solution:
Clearly x j ≥ 1 and x j x j + q j ≥ 1 2 opt(i) .
The solution x is a 1 2 -approximate solution to optimization problem (56) and therefore by iterating over all i ∈ N and returning the maximum of all these approximate solutions is a 1 2 -approximate solution to optimization problem (19).
